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DRINK IF YOU DARE: THE CIVIL AND CRIMINAL CONSEQUENCES 
FOR THE VICTIM OF INTENTIONAL DRINK SPIKING 
MANDY SHIRCORL AND MALCOlM BARRLn* 
I INTRODlJCTION 
In Australia it has been estimated that there are between 3000 and 4000 suspected 
incidents or drink spiking annually. I Drink spiking occurs when a person adds drugs 
or alcohol to the drink or another without their knowledge or consent.: With the 
recent death orDianne Brimble providing a graphic example orthe potential dangers 
or drugs used in drink spiking, calls to outlaw this activity have been gaining in 
momentum,3 
In July 2007, the Model Criminal Law o {licers' Committee or Attorneys-General 
released its {inal report into drink and {ood spiking,4 While acknowledging that 
various ollences against the person adequately covered serious {orms or drink spiking 
in most jurisdictions (with specific reference to the consequences or the drink 
spiking), the Committee recommended that a model law be enacted to cover the act oC 
mere drink spiking, which is defined as involving no further criminal behaviour. 5 In 
Queensland, such an of'!ence was enacted, prior to the Committee's {inal report, In 
Decem ber 2006.6 
The Queensland Governments enactment or new criminal offences against the person 
validates community sentiment that such conduct is worthy or public condemnation 
'" Mandy Shircorc is a Lccturer and Malcolm Barrett a Senior Lecturer in the School o/" Law at James 
Cook University, Cairns Campus. 
I Taylor, Prichard and Charlton, Notional project on drink spiking: investigating the noture and extent 
of drink spiking in Austmlio (AIC 2004). 
1 Ibid ix. 
, Dianne Brimblc died on a P & 0 cruise alter consuming a large quantity or the drug gamma-
hydroxybut)Tate, known as "GHB" or "Lmtasy", in suspicious circumstances. An inquest into her death 
has round that there is enough evidence to charge persons over her death and the matter has been 
rcJcrred to the Director or Public Prosecutions . 
.j Model Criminal Code OrJicers' Committee or the Standing Committee or Attorneys-General, Drink 
Spiking Discussion Paper (May 2006). 
5 Ibid,29. 
I> Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 316A. 
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and warrants state sanction. It also signilies that the conduct must be deterred and that 
potential victims must be allorded the protection or the law. As the possible 
ramifications lor the victim or drink spiking are so varied, both in form and severity, 
the extent oC legal protection ollered to victims, raises a number oC dillerent and 
dilTicult questions. 
While there is no general principle that all criminal ollences against the person must 
have a corresponding civil remedy, the recent emergence or a tort or invasion oC 
privacy was premised on the basis oC the existence or a relatively new criminal 
orlence. 7 At lirst glance how'ever, the nature or any analogous civil remedy available 
lor the victim oC intentional drink spiking is not obvious, particularly in relation to the 
newly created oCfence or mere drink spiking.s With altered mental state and memory 
loss a common eCfect or drink spiking, the potential consequences for the victim 
include not only victimisation by the orlender or others, but induction oC 
uncharacteristic and possible anti-social behaviour. In such circumstances it may be 
expected that the victim should be able to rely on the induced state or intoxication as a 
delence to any oCfence committed in such state, however the criminal law in 
Queensland provides otherwise. With these issues in mind this paper explores how 
well the law protects the victim or intentional drink spiking. In doing so, the paper is 
divided into three distinct parts. 
II DRINK SPIKING ANI) THE LEGISLATIVE RESPONSE 
A TIJe iVatlire of Dril1k Spikil1g 
The most comprehensive report on the nature and extent oC drink spiking in Australia 
was prepared by the Australian Institute or Criminology (AIC) in 2004. The AIC 
applied a broad delinition to drink spiking as 'drugs or alcohol being added to a drink 
(alcoho lic or non-alcoholic) without the consent oC the person consum ing it.,9 It was 
, See Crosse v Purvis (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81- 706 where Senior Judge Skoien held that an action 
in the tort or invasion or pri vacy was maintainable lor conduct that amounted to the criminal oJ'Jcnce or 
stalking. 
~ Crl1117110/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 316A 
<) Taylor, Prichard and Charlton, above n I, ix. 
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noted that under this definition no further criminal victimisation was necessary for an 
incident to be considered drink spiking. 
Due to issues or proof: under-reporting and dif'ferences in data collection across the 
jurisdictions, the AIC could only 'roughly' estimate the number or drink spiking 
incidents that occurred annually. In doing so they concluded that between 2002 -
2003: 
• 3000 to 4000 suspected incidents of' drink spiking occurred In 
Australia 
• approximately one third of'these incidents involved sexual assault 
• between 60 and 70 per cent oC these incidents involved no additional 
victimisation 
• between 15 and 19 suspected drink spiking incidents occurred per 
100,000 persons in Australia during 2002/2003. llJ 
They concluded further that while drink spiking occurs in a variety oC places, it 
occurs most commonly in licensed premises with females aged under the age or 24 
the most common victims. II Despite public perception that illicit drugs were 
commonly used in drink spiking, alcohol was relerred to most olien as the likely 
unknown additive. I: The eilects oC drink spiking were most commonly said to include 
'memory loss, nausea, vomiting, unconsciousness and dizziness,.13 
B The Legislative Respol1se 
The Queensland parliament became the first jurisdiction to respond to the Model 
Criminal Code Orticers Committee discussion paper on the issue or drink spiking by 
enacting the Criminal Code (Drink Spiking) and Other Acts Amendment Act 2006 
10 Ibid x. 
II It was concluded that Jour out oC Jive victims are JCmalc, with about halC under the age oC 24 and 
about one third between 25 and 34. 
11 Taylor, Prichard and Charlton, above n I. xi. It was suggested that this may be because or the 
diJ1iculty in detecting drugs in the body. 
11 Ibid ix. The committee noted that these erJccts also occur alter voluntary consumption oCalcohol and 
drugs which may distort a person's perception oC whether their drink has been spiked. The committee 
noted Curther that victims stated 'that the cJkcts that they had experienced were very di Jkrent Ji-om the 
cJkcts oCvoluntary alcohol consumption. 
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(Qld) (Amending Act).14 The Amending Act introduced the ortence orunlawful drink 
spiking into the Criminal Code /899 (Qld) (the Code).15 The Code, has always 
contained ortences that criminalized the administration of certain substances l6 to 
another however prior to the Amending Act all of those ortences required proor that 
the accused had a further intention to either commit an ortence or to victimise in some 
way the person subjected to the spiking. 17 The ortence of unlawful drink spiking fills 
a gap that had existed where spiking takes place in the absence orany further intent to 
commit an ortence or to victimise the person. As stated in the explanatory notes to the 
Amending Act the offence of unlawful drink spiking was introduced so as to protect 
individuals from the 'potential [non intended] harm that may flow to victims 0 r drink 
spiking.,18 
The physical element or unlawful drink spiking requIres a person to administer or 
attempt to administer to another a substance, which is contained within a drink in 
circumstances where the other person does not have knowledge orthe existence orthe 
substance. 19 It was unnecessary to define the term administer as the section provides 
an inclusive and extended definition or the term attempt to administer.~o The 
definition includes adding or causing a substance to be added to a drink in preparation 
for the adm in istration 0 r the substance. I t also includes substituting a drink with 
another drink that contains the substance and taking steps to provide a drink 
containing the substance instead or another drink in preparation for its administration 
of the substance.~l 
The offence is limited to the spiking of drinks, therefore the spiking or food where 
there is no further intent to commit an oflence or victimise the person is not a criminal 
IcJ Model Criminal Code 011ieers' Committee or the Standing Committee or Attorneys-General, Drink 
Spiking Disclission Popel' (May 2006). 
I5Crilllino/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 316A. 
16 The substances arc described as "drugs or other things" or "stupefying or overpow'ering drugs", or 
"poison or other noxious things." 
17 Crimino/ Code 1899 (Qld) ss 218(c), 316, 322, 323(b). 
I~ Explanatory Memorandum, Crimino/ Code (Drink Spiking) and Other Acts Amendment Bill 2006. 
1'1 A person docs not have knowledge or the substance in circumstance w'here they arc entirely unaware 
orthe substance and also where they arc unaw-are orthe particular quantity or the substance (sec 
Crimino/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 316A( I )(a). 
10 Crimino/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 316A(6). 
11 Crimino/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 316A(6), (7). 
l'age 6 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALT A 
2007 Refereed Conference Papers 
orlence. The Model Criminal Law Onicers' Committee:: in its linal report on drink 
and lood spiking, released alter the Queensland Parliament enacted the olTence oC 
drink spiking, recommended that all jurisdictions criminalize not only drink spiking 
but also the act orlood spiking.:3 
The mental element oCthe Queensland olTence orunlawCul drink spiking requires the 
administration or attempted administration to be accompanied by the 'intent to cause 
the other person to be stupelied or overpowered.'24 The 0 rlence there lore does not 
require that the alleged victim be in anyway stupe lied or overpowered but rather that 
the accused intended such a result. The term causing the person to be stupefied and 
overpowered includes the circumstances where the person did not intend to be 
~ ~~ 
stupelted or overpmvered at all. -- It also includes causing the victim to be lurther 
stupeiled or overpowered than they had intended or to a greater extent than they had 
intended. Stupe lied or overpowered are delined so that the accused must intend to 
induce a state or intoxication where the substance to be administered is alcohol, a 
drug or another substance.:6 However where the substance to be administered is a 
dangerous drug within the meaning oCthe Drugs A1isuse Act /986 (Qld) the accused 
need only intend to bring about a behavioural change.:7 
Although the enactment oC the orrence or unlaw lui drink spiking is a welcomed 
deterrent to would be spikers, the Queensland reforms do not go far enough in 
11 The Model Criminal Code 011icers' Committee was renamed as the Model Criminal Law Orlicers' 
Committee in July 2006. 
23 Thc issuc or lood spiking was raiscd during thc consultation proccss lollowing the releasc or the 
Committees Discussion Paper (sec Model Criminal Law Orlicers' Committee or the Standing 
Committee or Attorney-General, Drink and Food Spiking Fino/ Report (July 2007) 2. The South 
Australian Parliament in its recently enacted Crimina/ LUll' Conso/idofion (Drink Spiking) Amendment 
Act 2007 has adopted thc recommendations. Thc relevant scction states . r al person is guilty or an 
orlence irthe person adds a substance, or causes a substance to be added, to any lood or beverage ... .' 
Crimina/ Low Conso/idotion Act 1935 (SA) s 32C. 
1cJ Crimina/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 3l6A( 1). 
15 Crimina/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 316A(7) delines 'circumstances, where the other person is not intending 
to be stupe lied or overpow'ered, including any circumstances or timing, place, condition, or way or 
stupeiaction or overpowering.' 
16 The wmding is unlortunate as it suggests that the Crown must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that 
thc accuscd intend to bring about a state or intoxication rather than bring about a degrec or intoxication. 
17 Thc ol'lCnee also statcs that ccrtain things arc immaterial to thc ol'lCnee and that the act or drink 
spiking is not unlawlul i r it is carried out by a health prolessional in the course or their practice, it is 
carried out pursuant to an Act or it is carried out by a person periorming their responsibilities as a 
parent or carer. The ol'lCnce also extends the application or the excuse or mistake or bct \'ihere the 
substance administered or attempted to be administered \'ias alcohol. 
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protecting victims or spiking. rirst, as already stated the law rails to criminalise the 
act or food spiking. Secondly, as argued below, the reforms do not protect the victim 
or drink spiking from the potential adverse consequences that may result from his or 
her victimisation and for which he or she should not be held responsible. As stated by 
the Tasmanian Law Reform Institute, 'it seems a basic principle or rairness that an 
individual who for example, has had their drink spike[d], should not be criminally or 
civilly responsible lor what they do later'.:& 
III THE DEFENCE OF INTOXICATION 
A Determining criminal responsibility 
Evidence that an accused committed an offence as a result or being subjected to drink 
spiking may be taken into account in all Australian jurisdictions in determining 
criminal responsibility?) Intoxication due to drink spiking may rail within what is 
variously described for the purpose or criminal responsibility as non-voluntary 
intoxication, non self-induced intoxication, involuntary intoxication or non-intentional 
intoxication. Despite the dilTerent language used the terms all include 'intoxication 
produced by trickery or fraud' or which drink spiking is a species. 3lJ In reference to 
the Code the state is correctly described as either non-intentional intoxication or 
un intent ional intox ication. 
B Defence of intoxication 
1~ Tasmania Law RcCorm Institute, intoxicotion ond Criminol Responsibility Finol Report No 7 
(August 2006) 97. 
1'1 Criminol Code 1995 (Cth) s 8.5: Criminol Code 2002 (ACT) s 34: Crimes Act 1900 (NSW) s 
428G(2): Criminol Code 1983 (NT) s 43AV and Criminol Code 1913 (WA) s 28. For law in Victoria 
and South Australia sec the majority in R v 0 'Connor (1980) 146 CLR 64 (Barwick C1 87-88: Stephen 
1 105: Murphy 1 113-114: Aickin 1 125-126). The decision was concerned with the roIe or voluntary 
intoxication in determining criminal responsibility, however in the absence or any authority that 
considers the question or non-voluntary intoxication the principles set out in R v 0 'Connor apply 
irrespeeti ve or hm'i the state or intoxication was caused. Arguably the position in R v 0 'Connor also 
applied in Tasmania (sec Snow rt 9621 Tas SR 271, 278 and the Tasmania Law RcCorm Institute, 
intoxicofion ond Criminol Re,\jJonsibility Finol Report /1/0 7 (August 2006). 34). 
W Fairall P A and Yeo S. Criminol Defences in Austrolio (4 th Ed 2005). 231. Non-voluntary 
intoxication may also include 'intoxication produced by, duress or coercion: the un lor seen side-el'lcets 
or a drug: or un witting inhalation or rumes or gas.' Sec also Crilllinol Code 1995 (Cth) s 8.1: C'rilllinol 
Code 2002 (ACT) 30: Vietorian Law Commission, Defences to Homicide: Finol Report (2004), 127 
lor a proposed dclinition or in voluntary intoxication. 
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The Code includes a specilic derence or unintentional intoxication. The Code also 
provides that evidence or unintentional intoxication and intentional intoxication can 
be taken into consideration in determining whether the Crown has proven the 
existence oC intent where intent is an element oCthe oflence charged. Section 28 orthe 
Code states that: 
Intoxication 
( I ) The provisions or section 27 [the defence 0 I' insanity] apply to the case 0 C a 
person whose mind is disordered by intoxication or stupelaction caused 
without intention on his or her part by drugs or intoxicating liquor or by any 
other means. 
(2) They do not apply to the case oC a person who has, to any extent 
intentionally caused himselC or herselr to become intoxicated or stupe lied, 
whether in order to ailord excuse lor the commission oC an oilence or not and 
~vhether his or her mind is disordered by the intoxication alone or in 
combination lvith some other agent. 
(3) When an intention to cause a specific result is an element or an of'lence, 
intoxication, whether complete or partial, and whether intentional or 
unintentional, may be regarded lor the purpose or ascertaining whether such 
an intention in lact existed. 
Since the Code was enacted in 1899 the section has been the subject or only one 
substantive amendment with the Criminal renv Amendment Act /997 (Qld) adding the 
additional highlighted words. Although on lirst reading the section seems to provide 
substantial protection lor victims oC drink spiking who become perpetrators, in 
practice the section would apply in an extremely narrow range oC circumstances. 3 ! 
There are at least !lve reasons why the section is unlikely to be oC assistance to a 
victim turned perpetrator. 
rirst the terms intentional intoxication or stupelaction have been interpretated by the 
Courts so as to I im it the scope 0 I' s 28( 1) and so as to give a wide app licat ion to the 
proviso lound in s 28(2). Secondly s 28( 1) has been held to be a defence, which 
requires the accused to prove its elements on the balance oCprobabilities. Thirdly the 
delence only applies to what are referred to as gross states oCintoxication. rourthly iC 
the defence is proved the accused is not necessarily entitled to his or her Creedom. 
11 The dclcnce applies to all ol'lCnces unless expressly excluded. For examples orexpressly excluded 
ol'lCnces see unauthorised dealing with shop goods, leaving a hotcl without paying and unauthorised 
damage to property: Regll/ut()f~F Offences Act 1985 (Qld) ss 5, 6, 7 read in conjunction with Crilllino/ 
Code 1899 (Qld) s 36. 
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Pif1h it has been widely accepted that s 28 'covers the iield' as to the relevance or 
intoxication to criminal responsibility. The historical application or this concept 
means that although evidence orunintentional intoxication is relevant in determining 
the Emit element or an offence where intent is an element, it is irrelevant in 
considering a wide range or oflences where the rault elements involves knmvledge, 
belieC wiliulness, dishonesty or negligence. 31 
I Intentional intoxication or stuP'1laction 
The terms intentional intoxication or stupeiaction has received limited judicial 
consideration. In one or the fbv decisions to consider what is meant by the terms 
stupdY or intoxicate, Scott J orthe Supreme Court or Western Australian relied on a 
dictionary definition.33 The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary de!lnes stupefY to 
mean '[t]o make stupid or torpid; to deprive or apprehension, feeling or sensibility to 
benumb, deaden. To become stupid or torpid; to grow dull or insensible.' The Oxford 
English Dictionary defines intoxicate to mean '[t]o stupefY, render unconscious or 
delirious, to madden or deprive or the ordinary use or the senses or reason, with a 
drug or an alcoholic liquor; to inebriate, make drunk.'34 Por the most part the 
dictionaries define the terms by rderence to a state or being drunk, stupe !led or 
inebriated. This interpretation is supported by the iact the section rerers to an 
intentional or unintentionally caused state. On this basis an intentional state or 
intoxication or stupefaction is one where the accused set out to become drunk or 
inebriated whilst unintentional intoxication or stupeiaction includes where the 
accused consumes to become convivial. 35 
Applied to drink spiking, an inebriated victim accused or committing an oflence could 
rely on the defence in circumstances where they had not intended to consume any 
intoxicating or stupefYing substance or where they had intended to consume such 
substances but not intended to consume to the point or becoming drunk or inebriated. 
'') 
-'- It also has limited signi licance when raising an excuse or proving a dclcnce. For a comprehensi ve 
discussion or this topic sec Tasmania Law Relorm Institute, Intoxicution and Criminal Responsibility: 
Finol Report (August 2006), 35-40; Tolmie J, , Intoxication and Criminal Liability in New South 
Wales: A Random Patchwork' (1999) 23 Criminol LOll' Journol 218,225-236; Fairall and Yeo, above 
n 30, 235-240. 1, Hoggie v A1eredith (1993) 9 WAR 206. 
,-1 (1993) 9 WAR 206,210. 
,50' Regan R S, Essays on the Australian Criminal Code (1979) 71. 
Page III 
Australasian Law Teachers Association - ALT A 
2007 Refereed Conference Papers 
This interpretation or s 28( 1) and (2) or the Code is arguably consistent with Grinith 
C J somewhat ambiguous statement in R v Corhett36 that a jury should lind an accused 
'not guilty on the grounds or unsoundness or mind' ir at the time or commission 
he/she was intoxicated 'under circumstances for which he could not be fairly held 
responsible.,]7 It is also in accordance with the courts consistent rei"erence to intent as 
meaning 'to have in mind ... having a purpose or design. ,38 
The 1997 amendment and judicial statements as to the operation or s 28( 1) and (2), 
support a second narrower interpretation or the section. The Queensland Court or 
A I · R B ,9 d R P' 4l) h 'I . . I' I h I' ppea In e romagc an e rtt uses t e term vo untary Ingestlon 0 a co 0 
in substitution for the phrase' intentional intoxication or stupefaction'. 41 Based on this 
interpretation the derence would not be available where an accused's intoxicated state 
had, to any extent, been contributed to by the voluntary consumption or drugs or 
alcohol even though the accused intention was to only consume in order to become 
convivial. The additional words to any extent enacted by the 1997 amendment tend to 
support such an interpretation.4: As does the Queensland Court or Appeal's 
interpretation orthe \vord stupefYing within the context orthe ortence orstupefYing in 
order to commit an indictable oilence. 43 In R v Arnold; ex parte AG (Qld/4 
Mackenzie J, with whom the other members orthe court agreed, held that 'stupelYing 
in this context is that something has the ertect or dulling the senses or faculties or 
blunting the laculties or understanding.,45 This rerers to a degree or intoxication rather 
,h (1903) St R Qd 246. 
17 (1903) St R Qd 246, 249 
,~ R v Willlllot (No.2) rt 9851 2 Qd R 413, 418: R v Glehow r20021 QCA 442: R v Reid r20061 QCA 
202, r92lln R v Reid Chesterman J, observed that' rl1ntent and intention must have the same meaning 
wherever they appear in the Code.', r95l 
VI rt 9911 I Qd R 1. 
.11i r20001 QCA 30 . 
.11 Ibid r3l See Explanatory Notes to the Cl'illlinol LUll' Amendment Bill 1996 (Qld). See also Hubert 
(1993) 67 A Crim R 181, 199: Bottle v The Queen (1992) 8 WAR 449,456: R v Doyle rt9711 WAR 
110, III where the Western Australian courts have substituted the word intention, as it appears in the 
dclence or involuntary intoxication, with the word voluntary. In R v Doyle Burt J rclers to the 
'voluntary intake or alcohol' and in Bottle v The Queen Pigeon J rclers to 'intoxicants rbeing1 
voluntarily consumed by the applicant.' 
.11 The Explanatory Notes to the Criminol Low Alllendment Bill 1996 (Qld) state that' rtlhe amendment 
or section 28 will exclude Jrom consideration a case in which voluntary intoxication is said to be one or 
a number or co-operating Iactors: 
.1, Criminol Code 1899 (Qld) s 317 . 
.1.1 r20021 QCA 257 . 
.15 Ibid r39l The decision is or interest by way oranalogy only as Mackenzie J clearly states that his 
Jinding is restricted to the context or s 317 or the Code. 
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than the state or being stupefied. The interpretation or unintentional intoxication or 
stupefaction to mean involuntary ingestion probably limits the defence in the context 
or drink spiking to the scenario envisaged by Gibbs J in R v 0 'C011110r46 where his 
Honour stated that: 
[a] person who has become intoxicated without any intention to consume 
anything intoxicating - for example, because his drink has been 
'surreptitiously laced', ... - is no more morally responsible for what he does 
than is a psychopath or a very young child. 47 
Arguable s 28( I) could also apply to a victim of'drink spiking who intentionally 
consumes such a small amount of' drugs or liquor, that the amount intentionally 
consumed could not in any meaningful way be said to have contributed to his/her 
intoxicated or stupefied state. This limited application of's 28(1) means that it would 
have little or no application where alcohol is the substance used to spike a drink 
because in most cases the victim \vould, at some stage during consumption, become 
aware that his or her drink had been laced with alcohol. 
Accordingly the de!ence would not be open in a situation similar to that of' the 1984 
unreported decision of' the Queensland Supreme Court decision of' Walsh. 48 In that 
case the accused had been drinking alcohol follmving a win by his football team. On 
his return home he inflicted multiple stab wounds on his neighbour, a woman he had 
known since childhood. The accused claimed that his drinks had been spiked with a 
hallucinogenic drug. He was acquitted on the grounds or involuntary intoxication. 
However the defence, as currently applied, could not be successfully relied upon by a 
current day accused who committed an ortence in similar circumstances to those of' 
Peter Walsh as there was no dispute that Walsh had intentionally consumed a 
46 (1980) 146 CLR 64. 
47 (1980) 146 CLR 64. 92. Although the sentiment or His Honour's statement is clear the rcierence to 
psychopath is uniortunate. It has been held that psychopathy is not a mental disease therciore the 
psychopath is criminally responsible (see R v Hodges (1986) 19 A Crim R 129). 
4H The decision is discussed in Leader-Elliott i. 'intoxication Ociences: The Australian Perspective' in 
Yeo S. Portio! Defences to A1urd(!/' (1990) 221. 
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substantial amount or alcoho 1. 49 It is argued that most victims or drink spik ing turned 
perpetrator would be in the same situation as Walsh, that is, their intoxicated state 
would in part be sell' induced and therdore s 28( I) would ofTer no ddence. The AIC's 
finding that for the period 2002-2003 reinforce the argument that s 28( I) would have 
limited application to victims or drink spiking. The AIC found that two thirds or all 
suspected drink spiking took place in a licensed premises and the most common 
spiking substance was alcohol.5o 
2 Section 28(1) is a d'1lence 
In the context or the Code the term derence is used to describe an exculpatory 
provision where the onus or proor is on the accused. 51 The term excuse is used in 
rderence to an exculpatory provision where the accused is simply required to meet 
the evidentiary onus. The evidential onus is discharged by pointing to evidence that 
enables a conclusion that the matter has been properly raised.5: The exculpatory 
provisions or the Code are excuses unless the particular provision states that proor 
rests on the accused or a certain state 0 r a flairs is stated to be presumed.53 Section 
28( I) does not expressly reverse the onus orproor however it applies section 27, the 
insanity provision, to a person who's ddence is based on unintentional intoxication or 
stupe!action. The courts have by way or obiter stated that the presumption or sanity 
!ound in s 26 or the Code, which reverses the onus or proo!: applies not only to the 
ddences or insanity but also to unintentional intoxication.54 Consequently s 28( I) is a 
de!l~nce and accordingly the accused must prove on the balance or probabilities that 
he or she was not intentionally intoxicated and that at the time or commission or the 
4'1 See Leader-Elliott I, The Commonweolth Criminol Code: A Guide/or Pructitioners, Commonwealth 
Attorney-General's Department, (2002), 167 where the author states at lootnote 183 that: 
'ra1mendments to the Queensland Criminal Code sinee 1985 would probably deprive a latter-day 
Walsh oi"his dcicnee.' 
50 Taylor, Prichard and Charlton, above n I x-xi. 
51 Ci"with the term excuse w'hieh is used in rcierenee to an exculpatory provision where the aeeused is 
simply required to meet the evidentiary onus. 
51 See Lovedoy v Ayre rt 9551 Qd R 264,267. 
5.1 Kenny R G, An Introduction to Crilllinol Low in Queenslond ond Westem Austrolio (6th ed 2004) 89-
90. 
54 See lJeornley v The King r 19471 St R Qd 51. 62, 66-67 (Philp and Matthews JJ). A degree or 
uncertainty is expressed by Philp J when his Honour states that the reversal or onus applies to 
unsoundness oi" mind and '(probably also in its extended sense, based on unintentional intoxication),. 
See also R v Miers rt 98512 Qd R 138, 142: R v Foy rt 9601 Qd R 225,244 (Philp J): R v Arnold; ex 
porte A-G rQld) r20021 QCA 357 r441 (Mackenzie J). 
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orlence the state oC intoxication had robbed them oC one oCthe three capacities set out 
in s 27 oCthe Code. 55 
The difTiculties or proving the defence or unintentional intoxication or stupefaction 
have been well documented. The Tasmanian Law Reform Commission in its recent 
report noted the resource implications in proving that the accused was unintentionally 
intoxicated or stupelied.56 Ian Leader-Elliott argues that, as the erlects or 
unintentional intoxication are not commonly known, reliance on the derence will in 
most cases require expert testimony. 57 The expert will be required to give evidence as 
to the erlect oC the likely substance or substances involved as well as its possible 
impact on the accused. rurthermore the claim that the conduct engaged in was caused 
by the substance that the accused did not intend to consume implies that the conduct 
was not characteristic orthe accused. Therelore the delence would be required to lead 
evidence as to the accused character. 58 As it is both diniwlt and costly to establish the 
delence, it is likely that a victim turned perpetrator iC charged with a minor oilence 
h '11' I 'i9 b' d k' bl' I 60 61 h . h' suc as WI u exposure,- emg run m a pu IC p ace, trespass trowing t mgs 
at a sporting event6: or even more serious orlences such as common assault63 would 
simply enter a guilty plea. 64 It is perhaps not surprising that the only reported case 
where the derence has been successlul involved circumstances oC medically induced 
55 There is a strong argument that the presumption or sanity should not apply to s 28( I) (see Fairall and 
Yeo. above n 30. 246). See also Re Bromage r 19911 I Qd R I where the Court or Criminal Appeal held 
that the provisions or s 27 and s 28 do not have the eriect or deeming unintentional intoxieation to be a 
state or mental disease or natural mental in lirmity as required by s 27 or the Code. Section 28(1) simply 
introduces a third state into s 27 that being intoxication or stupeJaction without intent. It is also possible 
to argue that the reversal or onus does not apply to \'ihether the accused \'ias unintentionally intoxicated 
but only applies to the question or the absence or one or the three capacities (see R v Al'I1old: ex porte 
A-G rQld) r20021 QCA 357 r441). 
56 Tasmania Law Rerorm Institute. intoxicotion and Criminol Responsibility: Final Report No 7 
(August 2006) 98. 
57 Leader-Elliott above n 49. 169. 
5~ The House or Lords addressed the practical diriiculties or relying on the deknce in R v Kingston 
rt 99512 AC 355. 376 (Mustill LJ). 
5'1 Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 9. 
60 Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 10. 
61 Summary Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s II. 
61 Summar), Offences Act 2005 (Qld) s 24. 
6.1 Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 335. 
6-1 This conclusion is supported by the lact that most victims or drink spiking are young and thercJore 
likely to have limited resources. About hal rthe victims or drink spiking are under 24 years or age 
whilst a lurther third are bct ween the ages or 25 and 34 (see Taylor. Prichard and Charlton. above n I. 
x-xi). 
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stupe!action. In R v Smitho5 the accused was acquitted oC a charge oC driving a vehicle 
in a manner dangerous to the public on the grounds that he was oCtemporary unsound 
mind due to unintentional intoxication. The defence was able to establish that the 
accused was under the influence or drugs administered to him whilst he was a hospital 
patient. 
3 Degree o/Intoxication 
As stated above it is not sunicient to simply prove that the accused was 
unintentionally intoxicated or stupe!ied. To come within the insanity provision, the 
de!ence must also prove that as a result oCthe intoxication or stupe!action the accused 
did not have the capacity to understand what he or she was doing or did not have the 
capacity to control his or her actions or did not have the capacity to know that he or 
she ought not have done the act or made the omission.66 It is accepted that in order to 
prove the absence 0 r one 0 l' these three capac ities it is necessary to prove that the 
accused was severely intoxicated or stupefled. 67 Therefore the state oC unintentional 
intoxication or stupe!action required would seem to be consistent with a state oC 
unconsciousness or at least a state orsemi-unconsciousness such that the person could 
be described as an automaton. A victim oC drink spiking whose mind is merely 
deranged, so that he or she cannot resist the temptation to commit an orience, could 
not success!ully rely on the unintentional intoxication de!ence. 68 
4 Uncertain consequences (~/a section 28(/) d'1jcnce 
Even ir a victim turned perpetrator is able to success!ully prove that he or she was 
unintentionally intoxicated or stupefied the consequences for that person remain 
uncertain. In R v Smith69 the Court oCCriminal Appeal held that successful reliance on 
the de!'ence oCunintentional intoxication results in the accused being acquitted on the 
grounds oC insanity.7o Consequently the accused does not 'walk !ree' but is to be 
detained according to a courts order be!ore being dealt with in accordance \vith the 
,,5 r 19491 ST R Qd 126 
"" Criminal Code 1899 (Qld) s 27. 
,,7 Sec R v COl'beff r 19031 St R Qd 246, 249: Leader-Elliott above n 48,222. 
"H In this respect the Code is consistent with the common law: sec R v Kingston fl9951 2 AC 355. 
,,<) fl9491 St R Qd 126. 
71i The decision was cited with approval in R v r '0)' r 19601 Qd R 225, 244. 
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Mental Health Act 2000 (Qld).71 In such circumstances the terms or the person's 
detention are at the discretion orthe Governor in Council./2 Leader-Elliot points to the 
example or Peter Walsh who was detained in custody lor six months during which 
time he was subjected to psychiatric tests and treatment. 73 When Cabinet ordered his 
release it was made conditional on his abstaining lrom the use or alcohol or other 
drugs and on him continuing to receive psychiatric treatment.74 Such an uncertain 
outcome or raising unintentional intoxication is a substantial disincentive lrom 
reliance on the de!i~nce, particularly irthe accused races relatively minor charges. 
5 Section 28 Covers the Field 
The courts have referred to s 28 0 I' the Code as covering the field with respect to the 
role or intoxication as it relates to criminal responsibility.7s In R v KUSU 76 the 
argument that s 28 covered the field was used to explain the relationship between ss 
23,27 and 28 orthe Code.77 An act occurring independently ora persons will within 
the terms or s 23( I) can be ascribed to a state or insanity, as defined by s 27( I), and to 
a state or intoxication within the meaning ors 28. In this context the covering the lield 
argument means that the general gives way to the speciric. Therelore ir evidence is 
lead to establish that an accused was so intoxicated that his or her acts could be 
described as occurring independently or his her \vill then only s 28 could be applied 
and not s 23( 1). 
Decisions that have lollowed R v KUSU78 have given the principle orcovering the !ield 
a broader application. 79 Accordingly evidence or intoxication is not relevant to 
71 Crimil1o/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 647( I). 
71 Crimil1o/ Code 1899 (Qld) s 647(2). 
71 Leader-Elliott above n 48,222. 
7el Leader-Elliott above n 48,222, see Jootnote 32. 
75 See, eg R v Kusu rt 9811 Qd R 136, 140: R v Miers rt 9851 2 Qd R 138, 142: R v Mcljok r20051 I Qd 
R 308, 316. The term covers the Jield may have deri ved rrom the Tasmanian Court or Criminal Appeal 
decision or SI10lV v The Queel1 r 19621 Tas SR 271, 283. In the context or the Criminal Code 1924 (Tas) 
(Tosmol1iol1 Code) the argument that s 17 covered the Jield \'.!as or particular importance as unlike the 
Crimil1o/ Code 1899 (Qld) section 8 orthe Tosmol1io Code allowed a dcJcndant to rely on common 1m'.! 
dcJcnces ir those dcJcnces were not provided Jor under the TOSIllOl1iol1 Code (section 8 has recently 
been repealed). 
7(, r 19811 Qd R 136, 140-141. See also Re Bron1oge r 19911 1 Qd R I, 5. 
7; Although some statements of the court ifread out or context are capable or having a broader 
application (see R v Kusu rt 9811 Qd R 136, 141). 
7H rt 9811 Qd R 136. 
7'1 See R v A1iers rt 98512 Qd R 138, 142: R v Mr::/jok r20051 I Qd R 308,316 
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criminal responsibility unless it can be brought \vithin the confines of's 28. On this 
basis evidence that an accused was the victim of'drink spiking would only be relevant 
for the purpose of'determining criminal responsibility in two circumstances. 8o first, as 
stated above, it would be relevant to the defence of' unintentional intoxication. 
Second, pursuant to s 28(3) it would be relevant as to whether an accused actually 
formed an intention 'when an intention to cause a specific result is an element of'an 
ortence.'81 Therefore evidence of' intoxication whether completely or partially 
intentional or unintentional could be considered in determining whether an accused 
possessed the request intent for the ortence of' murder82 or intentionally causing 
grievous bodily harm.8] However evidence of' intoxication would not be relevant to 
ortences that do not have a mental element such as manslaughter84 or causing 
grievous bodily85 harm unless it was capable of'supporting a defence within s 28( I). It 
also means that independently of's 28( I), intoxication is not relevant where an oflence 
has a fiwlt element other than intention. for example a victim of' drink spiking 
charged with wilful damage to propert/6 or negligent acts causing harm 87 could not 
point to evidence of' intoxication to raise doubts that the prosecution had established 
beyond reasonable doubt that the accused had acted wilfully or negligently.88 
IV CIVIL CONSEQUENCES 
A Defil1il1g tbe problem 
As Cane notes '[tJhe dominant function of' criminal law is the regulation of' conduct 
by the imposition of' penalties, whereas the dominant function of'the civil lmv is the 
prevention of'rights violation and the repairing of' harm by the award of' damages,.89 
Ku Sec R v Kusu fl9811 Qd R 136, 142 as to the relevance or intoxication to issues not going to the 
question or criminal responsibility. 
KI Cl'imil1ol Code 1899 (Qld) s 28(3). 
Kl Cl'imil1ol Code 1899 (Qld) s 302. 
K.1 Cl'imil1ol Code 1899 (Qld) s 317. 
Kcj Cl'imil1ol Code 1899 (Qld) s 303. 
K5 Cl'imil1ol Code 1899 (Qld) s 320. 
K6 Crimil10l Code 1899 (Qld) s 469. 
K7 Crimil10l Code 1899 (Qld) s328. 
KX Sec, eg, R v 0 'Regol1 rl9611 Qd R 78 where the Court or Criminal Appeal held that evidence or 
intoxication \'ias not relevant as to whether the accused possessed the requisite fault element or 
knowledge. 
K'I Peter Cane 'Mens Rca in Tort Law' (2000) 20 Oxj()lyj joul'l1ol o/Legol Studies 533, 555. 
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The ability oCthe civil law to prevent and repair a violation oCthe right to bodily and 
mental integrity occurring through drink spiking, Corms the focus oCthis section. 
The protection or a person's bodily integrity has long been recognised as a 
fundamental right under tort law. 9o Where the violation has involved direct physical 
contact, the right is so sacrosanct that it is actionable per se. 91 A right to freedom 
from interference with mental integrity has also been recognised, although in carefully 
defined circumstances. 9: Where the defendant's conduct involves an intentional 
wrongdoing, there is little doubt that it is more morally culpable than unintentional or 
accidental harm, yet there is no general principle that intentional in fliction oC harm, 
without justification is tortious. 93 In fact the relationship between the mental state oC 
intention and the required elements for tortious liability is ofien poorly defined and 
confused. 94 
In 1993, in Grosse v Purvi.~,95. Judge Skoien remarked 
It may be relevant to note that in perhaps all oC the offences 
contained in the Code in which an individual person would be named 
in the indictment as the complainant (or victim) an actionable tort is 
encompassed so that the victim would have the right to sue in the 
civil court for damages. One might ask why would that not also 
apply to a new ortence like stalking In which the victim surters 
personal injury or other detriment? 
<)0 Re r' (Mento/ Potient Steri/isotion) r 19901 2 AC I, 72E, (Lord Goff or Chi veley). 
<)1 The tort or trespass which involves direct and intentional (or negligent) contact with a person without 
consent is actionable \vithout proor or damage. 
<)1 Both the tort or negligence and the action on the case lor intentional inlliction or harm require proor 
that the plaintilT has surlcred a recognised psychiatric injury. See, eg, TUlIIe v i\'ew South ~Jfu/es: 
A nneffs v A ustI'U / iun Stofions Pty Ltd (2002) 21 1 C LR 3 I 7. 
<)1 Cane, above n 89, 533. See also Christian Whitting 'or Principle and Prima Facie Tort' (1999) 25 
Monush University LUll' Revinv 295 where he argues that a rreestanding or 'prima lacie tort' based on 
intentional inlliction or harm without just cause or excuse should be tortious. but cr Cane where he 
criticises attempts to recogniLe a 'general principle 'or intentional tort liability as a 'potential source or 
serious con rusion', 552. 
<)-1 See, eg, Stanley Yeo 'Comparing the Fault Elements or Trespass, Action on the Case and 
Negligence' (2001) 5 Southem C/'Oss University Lull' Revinl' 142, 143: Cane above n 89. 
<)5 (2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-706, r 4201 
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With the criminal law now recognising drink spiking as a criminal oiTence, what ir 
any civil consequences arise irom such conduct? As the possible consequences to the 
victim are so varied, the choice or action may initially depend on the type or harm 
suiTered. ror example, physical or sexual contact which occurs when a person has 
been 'stupefied' or 'overpowered' through the non-consensual administration oC a 
substance would lack the element oCconsent necessary to avoid an action in battery.96 
However the act or mere drink spiking without rurther criminal or tortious conduct, 
may involve only transient physical harm,97 or mental anguish, humiliation and 
distress, particularly in circumstances where the victim engages in unpredictable and 
possibly unknown anti-social behaviour as a result or the intoxication. In these 
circumstances the conduct still involves a violation oC bodily and mental integrity. 
Torts protecting the right to bodily and mental integrity include the tort oCtrespass to 
the person (namely battery), the innominate tort or action on the case ior intentional 
in!1iction oC harm, and negligence. The applicability oC these torts to the act and 
consequences or drink spiking illustrates the overlap, and continuing uncertainty oC 
the relationship bet ween these three actions. 98 
B Trespass to tfle per SOli 
At the outset it is important to note that as trespass is actionable per se, the degree or 
type or resultant harm to the victim would not be a bar to an action in battery. 
rurthermore as limitations to damages awards arising under some oCthe civil liability 
acts may not apply to intentional torts, trespass, iC applicable, may be a more 
. . h . b d . I' 99 attractIve optIon t an an actIon ase In neg [gence. 
% In Australia conscnt is bcst viewed as a deJCnce to an action in battery. See eg Mci\'olIIo/'U V Duncon 
(1979) 26 ALR 584,588: Deportlllent 4Heolth & Community Services (jvn v JHB ond SAtE (1992) 
I 75 C LR 2 I 8, 3 I 0- 3 I I. 
'i7 Such as nausea, vomiting, headaches ollen associated w'ith hangovers. 
'i~ See Yeo, above n 94, l~r a comprehensi ve discussion or the lault clements or trespass, negligence 
and action on the case. 
'i'i See eg, Civil Liability Act 2002 (NS W) s3B(I )(a). For application or the section see J.4cCracken v 
.He/bourne Storm Rugby League Football Club r20051 NS WSC 107 SC 20071 /03 (Unreported, Hulme 
J, 22 February 2005). In Queensland the Civil Liobility Act 2003 (Qld) restrictions on damages awards 
applies to intentional torts, s 50. Although the restriction on the availability of exemplary damages does 
not apply to 'an unlawful intentional act done with intent to cause personal injury: or an unlmvlul 
sexual assault or other unlawlul sexual misconduct's 52(2). 
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The intentional tort of' battery, involves direct and intentional harmf'ul or offensive 
. h h 100 I . . h' ,. . contact Wit anot er. ntentlon In t IS sense comprtses a conSCIOUS purpose to 
achieve a result',IOI namely contact with the body of'the plaintifl Recklessness is also 
included which involves deliberate engagement in conduct with knowledge of'the risk 
of' certain consequences resulting but continuing to engage in the conduct.](J: for 
drink spiking the' intention' required would involve the intention to make contact 
with the body of'the plaintifTthrough the ingestion of'the unknown substance. 103 As 
with all trespass actions, there is no requirement that the ensuing harm to the victim 
be intended. 
In an American case concerned with experimental drugs (in the form of' pills) 
administered to patients without their knowledge of'the content, the court held that 
ingestion of' the pills was sufficiently analogous to administration through a 
hypodermic needle (which clearly involves physical contact) to amount to battery. 
The court stated '[tJhe act of' administering the drug supplies the contact with the 
plaintiff's person,.104 However the distinction between this case and the position in 
Austral ia is the requ irement in Austral ia for the contact to be direct. I 05 Directness 0 f' 
the defendant's act distinguishes trespass from case. I06 The line between what 
amounts to direct contact sufficient for trespass actions and indirect contact is not 
clear. I 07 
The distinction is often defined by reference to the example given by fortesque C] in 
luu Harold Luntz Torts: Coses ond Comme/1fOl)' (Revised 5 th ed, 2006), 693. 
lui Yeo above n 94, 143. 
Iul Beuls v HOY1l'0l'd rt 9601 NZLR 131, 142: R v Porker (1976) 63 Cr App R 211,214, both rcJcrred to 
in Trindade, Cane and Lunney The LOll' (4Tol'ts in A ustrolio (4 th ed, 2007), 42: See also Cane, above n 
89,535. 
lin This would also appear to include the situation where the contact 'is loreseen as substantially 
certain '. See Trindade, Cane & Lunney above n 102,40 rcJcrring to Glanville Williams, Criminol LOll': 
The Cenerol Port, (2 'ltl ed, 1961), P 38. 
1i14 A1ink v University 4Chicogo (1978) 460 F Supp 713, 718. 
lu5 H'illioms v /14ilotin (1957) 97 CLR 465: Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299, 307: A1cHoie v 
~Jfofson (1964) III CLR 384. Note that in Mink v University o(Chicogo (1978) 460 F Supp 713, 718. 
the court rcJcrred to the !act that there is no requirement lor the contact to be direct, so did not directly 
address this point. 
IU6 Hutchins v A1aughin r 19471 V LR 131, 
1117 See rurther eg in Trindade, Cane & Lunney above n 102 where they reJ'cr to the example given in 
the English Criminal Injuries Compensation Board's 11th and 9th Reports or the young ViOman \vho 
sulkrs severe brain damage as a result or drinking, at a party, the home-made beer laced with mcthyly 
alcohol, and ask is the act 'direet' lor battery,? 
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Reynold~' v Clarke/oN of'the def'endant who throws a log onto the high\vay hitting the 
plaintifT(direct contact) and leaving the log on the highway whereby the plaintifTtrips 
over it (indirect contact). Yet directness also encompasses those acts which set in 
motion a series of' events which ultimately result in contact with the plaintin: 109 In a 
case involving poisoning or the plaintill's dogs through the placement of'baited meat 
on land, the court noted that had the baits been given directly to the dogs the action 
would I ie in trespass, rather than case. ItO Yet commentators have questioned whether 
this would apply to the poisoning of' a human. III As the plaintif'f' is required to act by 
consuming the drink in order for the 'contact' to arise, the element of'directness may 
be lost. While it may be said that there is an unbroken chain of' events between the 
defendant providing the substance and the plaintifT's consumption, the plaintifT is not 
acting under compulsion when consuming the drink. I I: The act of' contact is 
ultimately brought about by the plaintin"s own conduct so that trespass is unlikely to 
be successfully pleaded. 
C .Veg/igence 
There are two schools or thought regarding the applicability of' negligence claims to 
intentional conduct. The Ilrst is that there is no bar to a claim in negligence for 
intentional interference, direct or indirect. The second is that the law or negligence 'is 
totally inappropriate for situations involving conduct that is deliberate or 
intentional,.113 
I .Veg/igence: an appropriate tort/()J' intentional conduct 
The argument that negligence applies to both intentional and unintentional conduct 
proceeds on the basis that negligence is not concerned with the mental state or the 
defendant, but with standards of' care objectively imposed in accordance with 
community standards. I 14 Accordingly whether the def'endant's conduct ralls below the 
relevant standard or care does not involve consideration of' whether the conduct was 
10K (1725) 2 Ld Raym 1399. 
lo'! Scoff v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm B 1 892. 
110 Hutchins v A1aughin r 19471 V LR 131. 
III Trindade, Cane & Lunney, above n 102, 77. The Lows (~lAustrolio r33.8.370l 
111 Unlike the situation in Scoff v Shepherd (1773) 2 Wm B 1 892 or Leollle v Bm)' (1803) 3 East 593. 
II, Trindade, Cane & Lunney, above n 102 p78 
11-1 Blythe v Birminghom See also, Yeo above n 94, 144: Cane above n 89, 536. 
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intentional or unintentional. The inquiry focuses on the existence and scope or any 
duty orcare and whether it has been breached. 
Support for this Vle\v can be found in the decision in H'ilson v Horne l15 where the 
court held that an action in negligence was applicable to a claim that the plaintifTas a 
child had been subjected to sexual abuse by her uncle. 116 Similarly in the case oC Gray 
v Motor Accident Commission i r the court held that an action in negligence lay where 
the derendant intentionally drove into the plaintifT who was a pedestrian. The peculiar 
and distinctive circumstances applying to motor vehicle accidents, whereby limIt must 
be established by the plaintirf' irrespective or whether the claim is brought in 
negligence or trespass may better explain this latter case. 118 More recently McHugh J 
did not doubt the correctness or the proposition that an action in negligence lay for 
intentional inter ference. 119 
ror the victim oC drink spiking, establishing negligence will requIre proor that the 
defendant owed the plaintirr a duty oC care not to provide him or her \vith an 
intoxicating substance without their knowledge; that the duty was breached; and that 
such breach was the cause oC the plaintifTs harm. There is little controversy in the 
proposition that a person owes another person a duty oC care in relation to the safety 
or the drink and food served to them, at least in relation to any physical harm that 
occurS. 120 Where the injury involves pure mental harm, it would be necessary for the 
victim to establish that it was reasonably foreseeable that she or he would surfer a 
recognisable psychiatric injury as a result 0 r the de fendant' s conduct, before a duty 
115 (1998) 8 Tas SR 363 (FC) 
116 The action was lramed in negligence to avoid the three year limitation period that applied to trespass 
claims. Note Evans J at r391 where he rclers to an unreported decision or COI'/'O/I v Folpp (Supreme 
Court or New South Wales 10 February 1998) where Dun lord J stated that' rH'illioll1s v A1ilotinl was 
not concerned with whether a dekndant who has lailed to take reasonable care lor the saldy or another 
can escape liability in negligence by showing that his actions were intentional: and I know or no case 
where it has been hcld to be a good dclence.' 
117(1998)I96CLRI. ~ 
II K IYillioms v J.4ilotin (1957) 97 CLR 465; Venning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299. 
II'! iVell' South ~Voles v Lepore (2003) 195 ALR 412. r 1621. It should be noted that this statement was 
made in the context of determining the scope of a school authorities' non-delegable duty or care owed 
to its students. Justice McHugh was alone in concluding that a non-delegable duty applied to the 
authority lor the intentional and unlawful conduct by a teacher towards a student. 
110 Southem v Unilever Aust Ltd r20071 ACTSC 81. 
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would arise. 111 I r negligence was actionable it would be considered a breach or duty 
to serve substances that could knowingly stupe I)' without the persons knowledge. 
As damage is the gist or a negligence action, the dilTiculty facing a victim or drink 
spiking will be establishing that they surrered a legally recognised form or harm, 
namely physical injury or psychiatric injury. It is unlikely that the transient nature or 
involuntary intoxication or altering or the mind through drugs \vould be considered a 
physical injury. Even when combined with physical illnesses commonly associated 
with a hangover, obvious limitations apply as the damages sought would be so slight. 
It is only where more serious consequences arise lor the victim that an action in 
negligence would arise. 
The extent or damages recoverable by the victim will depend on the reasonable 
lorseeability or the type or harm suITered. 11: It is not dinicult to imagine situations 
where the plaintirf's involuntary intoxication could result in physical injury, such as a 
motor vehicle accident or serious lall. The possibility or railing victim, in such a state, 
to sexual or criminal predators, other than the person responsible lor the drink spiking 
is also readily conceivable. However the ability to recover in negligence for unlawful 
sexual interlerence without physical or recognised psychiatric Injury IS 
questionable. 113 
In situations where the victim's involuntary intoxication leads to anti-social behaviour 
including the possibility or the commission or criminal olTences, policy 
considerations would ractor in determining recoverability lor any harm resulting lrom 
the conduct, such as criminal conviction or imprisonment. 114 In Hunter Area Health 
Service & Anor v Pres/and, 125 the Court or Appeal denied the plaintilTs claim that the 
Health Authority was negligent in failing to detain him when he was clearly in a 
psychotic state. The plaintifT claimed damages for the distress, economic loss and 
111 Tome v j\'ew South ~Jfoles: Annetts v A ustl'Ulion Stotions Fty Ltd (2002) 211 CLR 317. 
111 Overseos Tonkship (UK) Ltd v Morts Dock & £ngineering Co Ltd (The Wogon A10und (No 1)) 
rl9611 AC 388. 
In Sec. eg. ~Jfilson v Horne (1998) 8 Tas SR 363 (FC). where the plaintilTwas only able to recover in 
negligence lor sexual abuse which occurred as a child, w'hen she later developed post traumatic stress 
disorder, which amounted to a recognizable psychiatric injury. 
11-1 Sec, eg, Hunter Areo Heolth SelTice & Anor v Freslond r20051 NSWCA 33. 
115 r20051 NSWCA 33. 
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imprisonment that resulted lrom him killing his brother's liance shortly alter release 
lrom the hospital. The majority held that although the plaintilT was not criminally 
responsible for the murder, 'it would be unjust to render the appellants as deCendants 
legally responsible for a non-physical injury traced back to unlawful but not criminal 
conduct' y6 As the ddendant's conduct is more morally culpable lor intentional drink 
spiking, than a negligent act, it may be arguable that it is not unjust to hold the 
de!l~ndant liable lor the plaintilTs criminal conduct whilst involuntarily intoxicated. 
2 .Vegligence inappropriate./()r intentional conduct 
The second school orthought proceeds on the basis that while a trespass action can be 
maintained for negligent conduct, an action in negligence does not apply to 
intentional conduct.I~7 While this view appears to ignore the argument that proor oC 
negligence does not involve proor oC the mental state or the deCendant, recent 
comments by Gummow and Hayne JJ appear to support this view. In considering the 
scope oCthe non-delegable duty owed by school authorities to students Gummow and 
Hayne JJ stated 
As Williams v Milotin makes plain, negligently in!licted injury to the person 
can, in at least some circumstances, be pleaded as trespass to the person, but 
the intentional in!1iction orharm cannot be pleaded as negligence. 1~8 
Commentators views also diller on this issue. While most seem to clearly take the 
view that negligence does include intentional interierence,129 Trindade, Cane & 
Lunney rei"er to negligence as 'totally inappropriate' lor intentional conduct, although 
116 Ibid, Santm'i J. Cf Justice Spigelman CJ who dissenting said 'Where a person has been held not to 
be criminally responsible Jar his actions on the grounds of insanity, the common law should not deny 
that person the right to a remedy as a plaintiJTand the acts which would otherwise constitute a crime do 
not break the causal chain'. See also Statc Raihvay Authority of iVSJY v JYcigold (1991) 26 NS WLR 
500: Mcah v McCrca/llc/, rt 9851 I All ER 367 in these cases the plaintiff surlered compensable 
physical injury and the issue was whether responsibility extended to criminal activity. 
In Attempts to adopt Lord Denning's view in Lctang v Coopc/' rt 9651 I QB 232,239 that negligence 
should be reserved Jar negligent conduct and trespass Jar intentional conduct, with the distinction 
bet ween case and trespass discarded has not Jound !avour in Australia. See eg, H'illia/lls v A1ilotin 
(1957) 97 CLR 465: Vcnning v Chin (1974) 10 SASR 299:Huthchins v A1aughan rt 9471 VLR 131, 133 
(Herring CJ): Pargiter v Alcxander (1995) 5 Tas R 158, 161 
11K }VelV South ~Volcs v Lcporc (2003) 212 CLR 511. r2701. rclerring to Williams v J.4ilotin (1957) CLR 
465. C r Gro)' v A1otor Accidcnt Commission (1998) CLR l. r221 where exemplary damages were 
allowed Jar a claim in negligence brought Jor a deliberate driving into pedestrian. Although framed in 
negligence it \'ias noted that the case \'ias conducted as if trespass. 
119 See, eg, Yeo above n 94,148. Note also his rclerenee to G Williams & BA Hepple, Foundutions 4 
thc Low of Torts (1976),44. 
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they concede that the matter in Australia remains in doubt. 130 Sappidden and Vine 
reler to a case ordeliberate running down a pedestrian by a motor vehicle as an action 
in battery,131 and Luntz expresses surprise that Wilson v Horne l3 ]. was maintainable as 
•• • 11 1 
an acllon In negltgence.-
Whether an action In negligence can be pleaded lor intentional drink spiking IS 
there lore uncertain. 
C Action on the casej()r intentional injliction (?linjury 
The remaining tort or action on the case lor intentional in!liction or injury covers 
situations where the act or the derendant is intentional but the interference occurs 
indirectly. Sitting between trespass and negligence, it has been touted as a tort that 
could develop as a 'remedy lor intentionally inflicted injury resulting from invasion or 
dignitary interests'. 134 
Applying to both acts and words spoken by the de!i~ndant, the tort extends to the 
in !liction or both physical and mental injury. us Despite calls lor the tort to be 
extended to infliction or mental distress, as is the case in the United States,136 it is 
clear that in Australia, the plaintirr must have suClered a recognisable psychiatric 
injury in order to maintain an action. 137 
111.1 Trindade, Cane & Lunney, above n 102, 78, 30, 31 
1.11 Sappideen, et al Torts: Commentary and Materials (2006), r2.851, although it must be noted they do 
not speci lically state that an action in negligence could not be brought. 
1.11 (1998) 8 Tas SR 363 (FC). 
m Luntz, above n 100, r5.l.4l 
114 Penelope Watson 'Searching the Overlilll and Cluttered Shelves: IYilkinson v Dowi1fon 
Rediscovered' (2004) 23 University of Tasmania LUll' Review 224, 245. 
1.15 Bird v Holbf'()ok (1828) 4 Bing 628: H'ilkinson v DOll'nton rt 89712 QB 57: Bunyan v Jordon (1937) 
57 CLR l. Yeo, above n 94, takes a dirlcrent approach stating that Bird v Holbl'Ook involves elearly 
intended harm and could be brought as an action in negligence lallowing IYilson v Home (1998) 8 Tas 
SR 363 (FC). ~Vilkinson v DOlrnton he argues is akin to negligence as the bult element is objectively 
determined. See also Carrier v Bonham r20021 I Qd R 474. 
1111 Bamet! v Collection Service Co (1932) 242 N. W. 25 (Ia). Sec also Witting, above n 93. 
117 See, eg, Bunyan v Jordon (1937) 57 CLR I: Carrier v Bonham r20021 I Qd R 474: Gl'Osse v Purvis 
(2003) Aust Torts Reports 81-706. The position is similar in the United Kingdom, see, eg, Home Office 
v H'ail11vright r200 11 EWCA Civ 2081: C v D and SBA r20061 E WHC 166 (QB). 
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Since the seminal case oC H'ilkinson v DOH·nton l38 there has been much discussion oC 
the required mental element for this tort. In finding the deCendant liable for falsely 
advising the plaintif'f' that her husband had been injured in an accident, the news 
causing the plaintifTto sufTer shock and resultant physical injury, Wright J stated 
[t]he defendant has, ... wilfully done an act calculated to cause physical 
harm to the plaintirt' - that is to say, to infringe her legal right to 
personal sa fety, and has thereby caused physical harm to heL l39 
The word intention is not used in this definition of'the tort, although the tort has 
traditionally been identifIed as an intentional tort. Wilful, in this sense has been 
interpreted to mean voluntary140 and 'calculated' interpreted as 'likely to have [the] 
ertect' oC inflicting injury upon the plaintifl 141 Determining whether the defendant's 
act is 'calculated' has thus been equated to an intention to bring about a proscribed 
result (namely injury to the plaintirt), an imputed intention akin to recklessness and 
'an objective standard oC conduct, akin to, if' not identical with, the fault element oC 
h f' I' ,14') t e tort 0 neg Igence.· -
At a minimum the victim of' drink spiking would be required to establish that 
voluntarily spiking the victim's drink with the unknown intoxicating or stupefYing 
substance was 'likely to have the ertect' of' causing the harm claimed. According to 
McPherson JA this would involve a question of' whether the resultant harm was 
reasonably foreseeable. 143 It has been suggested, however that this test of'remoteness 
of'damage is not applicable to intentional torts and that the appropriate test is whether 
the resultant injury was intended or was 'the natural and probable consequence oCthe 
tortious act' .144 Although the most natural and probable consequence 0 f' intentional 
drink spiking would arguably involve mental distress and humiliation, the tort \vill not 
extend to such harms, further strengthening the calls that the intentional tort oC 
11K fl8971 2 QB 57. 
11') Ibid 58. 
lell .. 1 See Yeo, above n 94, 154. 
lell CorrieI' v Bonhom r200211 Qd R474. rl2l 
lell Yeo. above n 94. 154. This later statement linds support in McPherson JA 's judgment in CorrieI' v 
Bonham r20021 I Qd R 474, r27l 
lel, Ibid. 
lelel See Sappideen et ai, above n 131,67: quoting TCV Channel Nine Ply Ltd v Anning r20021 NS WeA 
82, fl 001, (Spigclman J): Palmer BnO'n & Parker Ply Ltd v Parsons 76 ALJR 163. 
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in !liction of' injury should be extended to this significant but lesser form of'mental 
harm. 
While the ofTence of'drink spiking fits most comfortably with the tort of'action on the 
case as it involves indirect and intentionally inflicted harm, the courts dogged 
insistence on a recognisable form of' harm will limit its application except in the 
serious cases of'physical or psychiatric harm. 
V CONCLUSION 
The introduction of' new criminal ofTences raises interesting questions regarding the 
nature and scope of' protection oflered by the law to the victims of' crime. As this 
paper demonstrates, victims of' drink spiking may find themselves particularly 
vulnerable in their state of' involuntary intoxication. Criminal defences which 
generally apply in situations where a person is subject to non-voluntary intoxication 
may prove to be of' limited application, leaving a person open to criminal prosecution 
where the intoxication leads to unplanned anti-social and unlawful conduct. 
While there may be very few instances where a defendant's pecuniary position makes 
a civil suit worthwhile, the inability of'tortious actions to protect a victim of'drink 
spiking is evident when considering the particular limits of'the torts that traditionally 
protect a person from interferences with their bodily and mental integrity. The historic 
requirement for direct contact in trespass, the uncertain application of' negligence 
actions for intentionally caused harm, leaves the rarely used tort of' action on the case 
for intentional infliction of' injury the most applicable tort. Unlike the United States, 
courts in Australia and the United Kingdom have resisted calls to extend the torts 
application to the infliction of'severe mental distress, railing short of' a recognised 
psychiatric injury. In these circumstances the ability of'torts law to provide a remedy 
to victims of'crimes against the person is severely curtailed. 
